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Abstract

Simulation enables analysis of social systems that would be difficult or unethical
to experiment upon directly. Agent-based models have been used successfully in the
field of generative social science to discover parsimonious sets of factors that generate
social behavior. This methodology provides an avenue to explore the spread of antigovernment sentiment in populations and to compare the effects of potential Military
Information Support Operations (MISO) actions.
This research develops an agent-based model to investigate factors that affect the
growth of rebel uprisings in a notional population. It adds to the civil violence model
developed by Epstein (2006) by enabling communication between agents in the manner
of a genetic algorithm, and by adding the ability of agents to form friendships based on
shared beliefs. To identify and quantify the driving factors of rebellion and the spread of
opinions, a designed experiment is performed examining the distribution of opinion and
size of sub-populations of rebel and imprisoned civilians. Additionally, two counterpropaganda strategies are compared and explored. Analysis identifies several factors that
have effects that can explain some real-world observations, and provides a methodology
for MISO operators to compare the effectiveness of potential actions.
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FORECASTING EFFECTS OF INFLUENCE OPERATIONS: A GENERATIVE
SOCIAL SCIENCE METHODOLOGY
I. Introduction
Background
Ten years into what has become the US’s longest war, it seems clear that the
Department of Defense (DoD) must invest more effort into understanding how a hearts
and mind campaign can be won. The most recent update of DoD Information Operations
(IO) doctrine, JP 3-13 (2006, p. ix), defines the purpose of IO as “to influence, disrupt,
corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our
own.” The five primary capabilities of IO are electronic warfare (EW), computer
network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception
(MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC). Air Force IO doctrine, AFDD 2-5 (2005),
breaks up IO differently: into electronic warfare operations (EWO), network warfare
operations (NWO), and influence operations (IFO). IFO is further split into PSYOP,
MILDEC, OPSEC, counterintelligence (CI), counterpropaganda, and public affairs (PA).
Each area of IO can be improved upon, but this thesis will take PSYOP as its focus area.
The purpose of PSYOP is defined by the DoD in JP-13.2 (2010, p. vii) as “to
influence foreign audience perceptions and subsequent behavior.” In AFI 10-702 (2011,
p. 2), the Air Force replaces the term PSYOP with the recently preferred term Military
Information Support Operations (MISO) and defines its purpose as “to induce, influence,
or reinforce the perceptions, attitudes, reasoning, and behavior of individuals, foreign
leaders, groups, and organizations in a manner advantageous to US forces and
objectives.” This definition is important; no longer is the US focused only on decision
1

making. Perceptions and attitudes are now recognized as critical to lasting behavioral
change.
The new focus on perceptions and attitudes introduces new difficulty to a force
traditionally focused on tangible effects. AFDD 2-5 (2005) discusses the challenges of
effects-based planning and battle damage assessment (BDA) in the psychological
domain. MISO effects are likely lagged, confounded with nuisance factors, and may
include unintended consequences. Effects are therefore difficult to directly measure, and
even more difficult to predict and plan for. Moreover, experimentation of MISO
campaign effects at home would be infeasible, unethical, or even illegal.
AFDD 2-5 (2005, p. 28) recognizes that plans, then, “may also be based upon
common sense, a rule of thumb, simplification, or an educated guess.” Relying on the
common sense of personnel experienced and trained in the application of MISO,
supported by expert intelligence products as noted in AFI 10-702 (2011), is the state of
the art, but there may be more objective ways to forecast and plan the effects of MISO.
Simulation provides a potential alternative to experimentation. Rather than
testing MISO directly on humans, it may be possible to build a virtual test bed for these
operations and observe the effects on software agents programmed to react in a
psychologically and culturally appropriate manner to stimuli in their environments. This
thesis explores the application of agent-based modeling (ABM) to the problem area of
MISO and the forecasting of its effects.
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Problem Statement
There is currently a dearth of simulations appropriate for forecasting the effects of
MISO operations upon the perceptions, attitudes, reasoning, and behavior of a foreign
populace. To allow for realistic results, a simulation must have a firm foundation in
psychological and sociological theory while being sufficiently parsimonious to be
approachable to commanders who may not have a background in the social sciences.
This thesis explores the use of ABM to generate sociologically valid behaviors from
experimentally validated psychological theories, and uses this simulation as a test bed for
MISO courses of action (COA).

Scope
The system being modeled here is not a specific real world environment or
population, but a generic scenario of autonomous individuals interacting with each other.
This represents a generalizable social landscape, which can be validated by comparing
behaviors to established sociological phenomena. It therefore represents a realistic point
of departure, or a virtual control treatment, for testing of MISO COAs. The intent is not
to accurately model, in a single replication, how a specific human society or group will
respond to a specific action. To accomplish this would require a level of complexity that
negates the communicability of the model, relegating it to a black box. Instead, the intent
is to find valid trends across replications that can inform assessment and comparison of
the effectiveness of potential COAs.
For this model, the level of modeling is the individual person. As Epstein has
pointed out, “individuals of any depth and interest are themselves societies” (2006, p.
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346), but modeling every motivational drive as separate agents in an individual would be
overly complicated for this application. From a practical perspective, this allows the use
of over a century of experimentally validated psychological theories as potential rules to
generate other experimentally validated sociological theories as emergent phenomena in a
complex system. This also is a perspective well-suited to the bottom-up design of ABMs.

Background
Agents and ABM
A model is simply an abstraction of reality. Some common types of models
include physical models, such as mockups of a construction project; conceptual models,
such as an individual’s perception of reality; mathematical models, such as simple linear
regression models; and simulation models, which are the focus of this paper. Banks,
Carson, Nelson, and Nicol (2010, p. 3) define simulation as “the imitation of a real-world
process or system over time.” Historically, there have been three distinct perspectives on
simulation: macrosimulation, microsimulation, and ABM (Gilbert & Troitzsch, 2005).
Macrosimulation is a top-down perspective using differential equations to define
variables in a system as function of other variables of interest (Macy & Willer, 2002).
An example of a macrosimulation method is systems dynamics. Microsimulation builds
a system bottom-up from the point-of-view of individuals, processes, and pieces of
interest in a system. An example of microsimulation is discrete-event simulation. ABM
grows out of microsimulation, maintaining the bottom-up perspective and adding the
important ability for individual pieces, or agents, in the system to directly interact with
one another.

4

What is an ABM?
There is much dispute about what truly constitutes an agent. Macy and Willer
(2002) propose four requirements for agents; they must be autonomous, interdependent,
follow simple rules, and be adaptive and backward-looking. North and Macal (2007)
require that agents be adaptive, able to learn and alter behaviors, autonomous, and
heterogeneous. Epstein (2006) lists common, but not required, features of agents as
heterogeneity, autonomy, limited spatial range of communication, and bounded
rationality. For the purposes of this thesis, an agent is defined as an autonomous entity in
a simulation defined by rules of movement and behavior that react to their surroundings
and/or neighboring agents. This definition is chosen over more stringent definitions
because they would discount important ABMs that do not have adaptive, heterogeneous
agents, such as Schelling’s classic model of housing segregation (1971).
An agent-based model is defined by agents, relationships between agents, and the
environment upon which they move and act (Macal & North, 2010). In modern
simulations this space often takes the form of a toroid, a rectangle wrapping at both
horizontal and vertical edges, but other spaces can be defined as best fits the system being
modeled. Relationships, or links, formalize lasting relationships between agents and the
effects thereof, and can be a source for additional analysis, such as social network
analysis.
Why use ABMs?
Bonabeau (2002) lists the advantages of ABM as the abilities to capture emergent
phenomena, naturally describe a system, and do so flexibly. Emergent phenomena are
“stable macroscopic patterns arising from the local interaction of agents” (Epstein &
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Axtell, 1996, p. 35). These are the result of ABMs typically describing complex adaptive
systems (Holland, 1995).
The ability to naturally describe a system is vital for operations researchers. In
operations research, models are typically built and simulations run by analysts to support
a decision maker (DM). These DMs may or may not have a background in the technical
bases of the model. For a DM to truly trust the results of a model, it must not be a black
box; instead, the DM should be able to understand at least the basic workings of the
model. It is therefore advantageous when an analyst can describe the model naturally by
describing agents as people, stating what each agent perceives and why they act as they
do.
The flexibility of ABM enables the intended use of this model: to act as a virtual
experiment for MISO COAs. Once a model gives valid outputs, modifications are
relatively simple to make. This allows an analyst to add stimuli such as leaflets or
propaganda posters, change the psychological or cultural parameters for a new target
audience (TA), or introduce new types of agents such as ambassadors or MISO operators.
History of ABM
The birth of ABM is regularly credited to Conway’s Game of Life in 1970, which
is pointed to as an example of ABM performed without the benefit of computers.
Conway did actually use a PDP-7 computer to discover many aspects of the game
(Gardner, 1970). This illustrates the importance of technology for ABM. ABM is a
young simulation perspective that is continually growing more robust with the increased
availability and power of computers.
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ABM of sociological phenomena is nearly as old as ABM itself. Schelling (1971)
built an ABM predicting racial segregation in housing based upon simple rules of moving
when half of neighbors on a 1-dimensional space were of the other race. He found that
there was a tipping point at approximately 20% minority population in a neighborhood at
which the neighborhood’s minority population would grow to 100%. The results have
been disputed, but the methodology was intriguing.
The next 10-15 years saw very little development, but as computers became
commonplace in the late 1980s, ABM began to re-emerge. Reynolds’s (1987) ABM of
boids depicting realistic bird flocking behavior seems to have ignited a renewed interest.
The boids acted on three simple rules; collision avoidance, velocity matching, and flock
centering. Even so, they exhibited the complex behavior of flocks that could not be
explained from a macrosimulation perspective.
Another influential ABM development is that of the genetic algorithm (GA), as
exemplified by Holland’s model Echo (1995). Echo captures the behavior of complex
adaptive systems by using a digital analogue to genetics. As agents replicate, “child”
agents are given a mix of the two “parent” agents’ characteristic string of 0s and 1s, with
some rare random mutations possible. This has been used successfully to find optimal
and likely solutions (Macy & Willer, 2002) and has been proposed for use in
evolutionary psychology (Lickliter & Honeycutt, 2003). The general nature of the GA,
like the larger field of ABM, holds the potential to be used in virtually any field.
The usefulness of ABM has been recognized perhaps more often than
implemented in the social sciences. The literature contains calls for application of ABM
with a robust backing in social science theory in social services (Israel & Wolf-Branigin,
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2011), evacuation models (Till, 2010), and social scientists working in areas where
rigorous experimentation is limited by ethical considerations (Ball, 2007).
Generative Social Science
Epstein and Axtell’s (1996) Sugarscape model demonstrated a new paradigm for
the study of the social sciences using ABM, which they call generative social science
(GSS). In Sugarscape, agents act according to very simple rules dominated by the drive
to acquire a resource, sugar, that exists in various amounts in different areas of the
environment, and without which the agent will die. Emergent behaviors of Sugarscape
include the emergence of differing cultures near geographically separated resource pools,
inequitable distributions of wealth, and a survival of the fittest that is stifled by familial
inheritance of resources.
Sugarscape demonstrates the key features of GSS. In a manifesto on generative
social science, Epstein proposes a motto for GSS: “If you didn’t grow it, you didn’t
explain its emergence” (2006, p. 8). Another key desideratum of GSS is the use of the
simplest possible rules to explain an emergent behavior of interest. The canonical agentbased experiment would be to “situate an initial population of autonomous heterogeneous
agents in a relevant spatial environment; allow them to interact according to simple local
rules, and thereby generate – or ‘grow’ – the macroscopic regularity from the bottom up”
(Epstein, 2006, p. 7).
GSS has gained significant popularity as a methodology, and examples of its
application can be found in many of the social sciences. In economics, GSS has been
used to demonstrate that diversity of suppliers leads to market stability (Zhang, Li,
Xiong, & Zhang, 2010), and to generate consumer decision making processes based on
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culture and psychology (Roozmand, Ghasem-Aghaee, Hofstede, Nematbakhsh, Baraani,
& Verwaart, 2011). In archaeology, Epstein (2006) demonstrated a realistic portrayal of
the history, and sudden disappearance of, the Anasazi culture of the southwest U.S. In
sociology, Mäs, Flache, and Helbing (2010) grew a cultural diversity in a population that
is robust to noise. Gorman, Mezic, Mezic, and Gruenewald (2006) developed a model of
drinking behavior and examined the positive and negative effects of the presence of bars
at which drinkers can congregate. Epstein (2006) grew the emergence of social class
hierarchy, as well as eruptions of civil violence in the face of occupying forces. In
psychology, Epstein (2006) generated the behavior of thoughtlessly applying norms of
behavior, which was subsequently supported in laboratory experiments by Willer, Macy,
and Kuwabara (2009). This demonstrates a powerful possibility for GSS to provide
theories of behavior that can be confirmed or rejected by traditional experimentation.

Social Science Primer
A basic foundation in the social sciences, and particularly social psychology,
should inform the development of a GSS growing sociological behaviors. While
encompassing all relevant social science is beyond the scope of this thesis, if not
impossible, two specific areas emerge as particularly relevant: influence psychology and
culture.
Influence Psychology
Influence psychology is a broad field of social psychology. Hogg (2009) points
out that, by one popular definition, social psychology is the study of influence. For the
purposes of ABM, the most relevant thrust of influence psychology research seems to be
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that of interpersonal persuasion. These concepts can be coded in a simplified manner as
agent rules of interaction. Cialdini (2007) identifies six major concepts that define
interpersonal persuasion: reciprocation, commitment and consistency, social proof,
liking, authority, and scarcity.
Reciprocation is defined by the drive to repay any perceived gift or favor given by
another person or group (Cialdini, 2007). This is the concept exploited by grocery stores
offering free samples of a product directly next to a display full of that product with the
expectation of higher sales. Furthermore, the effect of reciprocation can be compounded
by the foot-in-the-door effect, whereby people are inclined to give again once they have
given once, often in larger quantities or more substantial ways (Hogg, 2009).
Commitment and consistency act in concert, pushing people to commit to a
decision made or action taken and act consistently with that decision (Cialdini, 2007).
The state of information under which the original decision is made is irrelevant; one
remains likely to stand by early decisions in the face of evidence. One possible
explanation for this comes from cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957). This
predicts that a basic motivation in action and belief is a negative feeling experienced by
an individual whenever his or her actions and beliefs do not align with each other.
People will therefore, depending on circumstance, change action, belief, or both to
minimize the feeling of cognitive dissonance. Because past actions are impossible to
change, beliefs are more likely to change to fit those actions, and future actions will
mirror those new beliefs.
Social proof refers to the behavior colloquially known as monkey see, monkey do.
This is the tendency to see behavior as more appropriate or acceptable when others are
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observed to be performing it (Cialdini, 2007). Bandura (1977) identified this effect with
his social learning theory, which states that imitation of others’ behavior is a genetically
predisposed behavior. He also proposed that social approval is among the strongest
social reinforcers for people of all ages. Indeed, laboratory experiments show that people
will enforce norms of behavior, even those that they disagree with, in order to fit in
(Willer, Macy, & Kuwabara, 2009). This again can act in concert with cognitive
dissonance to be a very powerful factor in interpersonal persuasion.
Liking is a complex concept worthy of its own field of psychology. With regards
to social influence, it is useful to recognize that people are more influenced by people
they like than by people they do not like (Cialdini, 2007). Factors that influence how
much a person likes another include their subjective physical attractiveness, their
similarity to one another, ingratiating actions such as compliments directed toward him or
her, their familiarity with one another, and their mental associations of the other person
with other liked things.
Authority is an often-underestimated desire to act in accordance with the demands
or desires of authority figures (Cialdini, 2007). This was made famous, or perhaps
infamous, by Milgram in his classic experiments showing that most participants would
shock a screaming, pleading, and even unconscious confederate participant at the
instruction of a person in a lab coat (1974). Hogg (2009) points out, however, that mere
compliance is a surface behavioral change that does not have lasting effects on action.
Also, it appears that in cases of compliance the behavior is justified by the presence of an
authority figure, and thus it activates much lower levels of cognitive dissonance thereby
muting attitudinal shift.
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The final concept identified by Cialdini (2007) is scarcity, which predicts that
something that is rare is perceived as being more valuable than something that is more
abundant. In a model where agents gather resources, this could result in agents with
greater stores of resources having less motivation to continue gathering and therefore
more freedom to explore other opportunities.
Audience Factors
The previous factors do not explicitly take individual differences into
consideration, but naturally the audience of any message is as important as the source and
content of the message. Myers (2008) identifies two important audience characteristics
that lend themselves to being modeled: self-esteem and age.
Self-esteem has a non-linear effect on ease of influence; low and high self-esteem
individuals are more difficult to influence than those with moderate self-esteem (Rhodes
& Wood, 1992). High self-esteem yields confidence in one’s opinion, while low selfesteem yields low confidence in one’s correct comprehension of the message.
The effect of an audience’s age has been tested against two hypotheses: that
attitudes become more conservative as age increases, and that attitudes simply become
more resistant to change as age increases (Myers, 2008). Experiments support the latter
hypothesis; older people simply refuse to change their opinions while younger people’s
opinions remain more malleable. The observation of conservativism in old age merely
reflects the liberalization of the popular opinion over time.
Culture
While each individual acts according to their beliefs, attitudes, and personalities,
culture informs these values and may serve as a baseline in lieu of information on
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individuals. There are two commonly used frameworks for cultural attributes.
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions originally consisted of Power Distance, Individualism,
Uncertainty Avoidance, and Masculinity (1980). Added to the core four are Long Term
Orientation (Franke, Hofstede, & Bond, 1991) and most recently Indulgence (Hofstede,
Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010). Hofstede’s dimensions are focused on the roots of business
behavior, being intended to inform managers of multicultural teams.
The second common framework comes from the Global Leadership and
Organizational Behavior Effectiveness Research Project (GLOBE) (House, Hanges,
Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004). The GLOBE project surveyed 62 societies on a
framework expanded from Hofstede. It is also primarily business focused, but its factors
are both more specific and broader in scope. The nine GLOBE dimensions are
Uncertainty Avoidance, Power Distance, Institutional Collectivism, In-Group
Collectivism, Gender Egalitarianism, Assertiveness, Future Orientation, Performance
Orientation, and Humane Orientation.
Uncertainty Avoidance is the propensity for individuals to avoid uncertainty by
codifying norms of behavior (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004). Power
Distance is the level of individuals’ expectations of power stratification and
concentration. Institutional Collectivism is a measure of institutional encouragement of
collective distribution of resources and collective action. In-Group Collectivism is a
measure of the strength of identity with organizations, tribes, or families. Gender
Egalitarianism is a measure of society’s promotion of gender equality over strict gender
roles. Assertiveness measures individuals’ willingness to engage in conflict in social
relationships. These first six dimensions align with Hofstede’s original four dimensions,
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with Individualism split into the two Collectivism dimensions and Masculinity split into
Gender Egalitarianism and Assertiveness.
Future Orientation is a measure of the willingness of individuals to delay
gratification in favor of long-term planning; this corresponds with Hofstede’s Long-Term
Orientation (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004). Performance
Orientation is the cultural focus upon, and willingness to reward individuals for,
performance. Humane Orientation measures the value placed upon fairness, altruism,
and kindness between individuals. Performance and Humane Orientation are important
factors that are not directly addressed by Hofstede’s framework.
The empirically measured values of the nine GLOBE dimensions can serve as
parameters to affect the application of the rules derived from influence psychology. This
offers a practical methodology for accounting for differences in culture and target
audience for MISO COAs.

Application to MISO
The joint MISO process, shown in Figure 1, indicates the current cycle of MISO
execution. This process begins with planning the desired effect, and then examines the
target audience (TA) before beginning to generate a plan. Within this framework, there is
an opportunity to take the results of target audience analysis (TAA) and feed it into a
simulation that allows for comparison of potential COAs and their ability to generate the
desired effect without having deleterious secondary and tertiary effects. This simulation
cannot and should not replace a skilled analyst with familiarity with the TA, but it can be
a tool provided that it is usable and transparent to the analyst.
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Figure 1. Joint MISO Process (Department of Defense, 2010)

There are models that have been developed to fill this need, but they fall into two
categories that keep them from being used. First, there is the model that is too specific to
be generalizable to other target audiences and too complicated to have transparency to an
analyst or decision maker (DM). An example of this, and the problems associated with
communicating the underlying mechanics of the model to a DM, is the Socio-Cultural
Analysis Tool (S-CAT) (Murray, et al., 2011). The other case is the one that overfocuses on accuracy of forecasts and loses the ability to effectively perform what-if
analysis. An example of this is the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS), a
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) funded program (O'Brien,
2010). ICEWS began with a hybrid statistical, system-dynamics, and agent-based
modeling approach, but it gradually shifted during development to be dominated by
statistical models to focus on forecasting performance at the cost of what-if capabilities.
Models falling into either category are doomed to be of limited or no use to a MISO
planner.
Improvements in MISO can have significant implications for national security.
Successful implementation of MISO can prevent conflicts from requiring an armed
presence or diminish the cost and duration of a military intervention. Not only is this
desirable from a humanist perspective, as it limits human suffering and promotes peace, it
is also desirable from a fiscal perspective as the DoD begins to face budgets more limited
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than seen in recent years. Clearly a more peaceful, cost-effective solution is desirable for
the DoD and the international community.

Methodology
Our model represents a significant departure from Epstein’s (2006) civil violence
model. This research focuses on implementation of social psychology principles into
rules of interaction and communication while maintaining Epstein’s observed
characteristics to maintain validity. It remains important, however, to adhere to the tenets
of generative social science (GSS) and keep the applied rules as parsimonious as possible
to generate realistic behavior, so this remains a focus.
As with Esptein’s model, the scenario is a population under the influence of some
government that may be perceived to be more or less legitimate or effective.
Furthermore, the scope of this research is a generalized population interacting with one
another without consideration of specific individuals that could be modeled, such as
prominent leaders. One of the strengths of ABM is that such additional agent types can
be added in future research to increase the realism of the model.
COAs under consideration may take the form of a change in the environment, or
they may take the form of additional agent types that are more directly controlled than the
general population. For example, a propaganda poster would take the form of an
immobile agent that provides only one-directional communication about a very specific
topic. It remains beyond the scope of this research to predict the perception of a specific
message; instead, the specifics of modeling a given COA are left to the expert MISO
analyst.
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Model Construction
This model is developed from the agent level using the agent-based modeling
environment Repast Simphony Beta 2.0, developed at Argonne National Laboratory
(North, Howe, Collier, & Vos, 2007). This environment was selected based upon its
open-source nature and the base infrastructure being amenable to social systems. Other
environments were considered but discounted based upon their focus on process flow
systems.
Two major changes on Epstein’s (2006) model are effected. First, agents are
given the ability to communicate and alter their grievance. In order to maintain
heterogeneity in opinions, grievance is modeled as a gene as described by Holland (1995)
rather than as a single scalar. Second, agents during this communication make
friendships with like-minded others, which in turn alter patterns of movement.
The full code is presented in the appendices in six classes. Appendix A presents
the Globals and Panel Factory class, which codes the global variables and user interface
for the visualization. Appendix B presents the Observer class, where all methods called
by buttons on the user interface reside. Appendices C-F present the agent classes:
Civilians, Cops, MISO agents, and Relationship links.
Chapter 2 presents a detailed look at the development of this ABM and analytical
results. Chapter 3 provides a proof of concept case study, outlining how an ABM such as
this one may be used by a MISO analyst in planning a campaign. Chapter 4 concludes
with significant findings and discussion of potential areas for future research. Note that
Chapters 2 and 3 are structured as standalone papers, and there will be some overlap
between these chapters and Chapter 1.
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II. Analysis of Factors Influencing Civil Violence: An ABM Approach
Introduction
In the last decade, the United States has found herself fighting wars on a
battlespace she has little expertise with: the hearts and minds of populations whose
support can make or break a campaign. This sort of campaign relies heavily upon
Military Information Support Operations (MISO), operations whose purpose is “to
induce, influence, or reinforce the perceptions, attitudes, reasoning, and behavior of
individuals, foreign leaders, groups, and organizations in a manner advantageous to US
forces and objectives” (Department of the Air Force, 2011, p. 2). MISO is a difficult task.
The effects are nearly impossible to measure due to confounding nuisance factors outside
of the operators’ control, and experimentation is not ethically viable. Therefore,
forecasting of effects has traditionally relied upon subject matter experts armed with
sophisticated intelligence products (Department of the Air Force, 2005).
Simulation provides an alternative method for measuring and forecasting MISO
effects. Social systems tend to take the form of complex adaptive systems, which in turn
are best modeled by agent-based models (ABM). ABM of sociological phenomena is not
new; one of the first ABMs examined racial segregation in housing (Schelling, 1971).
Epstein and Axtell’s (1996) Sugarscape marked the beginning of a research paradigm
known as Generative Social Science (GSS). The key desideratum of GSS is the use of
the simplest possible rules to explain an emergent behavior of interest (Epstein, 2006).
GSS has gained significant popularity as a methodology, and examples of its
application can be found in many of the social sciences. In economics, GSS has been
used to demonstrate that diversity of suppliers leads to market stability (Zhang, Li,
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Xiong, & Zhang, 2010), and to generate consumer decision making processes based on
culture and psychology (Roozmand, Ghasem-Aghaee, Hofstede, Nematbakhsh, Baraani,
& Verwaart, 2011). In archaeology, Epstein (2006) demonstrated a realistic portrayal of
the history, and sudden disappearance of, the Anasazi culture of the southwest U.S. In
sociology, Mäs, Flache, and Helbing (2010) grew a cultural diversity in a population that
is robust to noise. Gorman, Mezic, Mezic, and Gruenewald (2006) developed a model of
drinking behavior and examined the positive and negative effects of the presence of bars
at which drinkers can congregate. Epstein (2006) grew the emergence of social class
hierarchy, as well as eruptions of civil violence in the face of occupying forces. In
psychology, Epstein (2006) generated the behavior of thoughtless application of norms of
behavior, which was subsequently supported in laboratory experiments by Willer, Macy,
and Kuwabara (2009). In this way, GSS and traditional experimental social psychology
can and should work hand-in-hand to advance the field.
Epstein’s (2006) civil violence model serves as the basis for the present work.
This model populated a 40 x 40 grid with Agents and Cops. Because the term Agents
implies that the Cops are not agents, we use the term Civilians. On this grid, Cops and
Civilians each move at random. On the basis of their perceived grievance against the
government, legitimacy of the government, individual risk tolerance, and the presence of
other actively rebellious Civilians and Cops in their local region, these Civilians at each
step decide if they will become actively rebellious. If they do, they become potential
targets for Cops to arrest and remove from the simulation for some period of time. Our
model expands on this to add communication between civilians and movement that is
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more grounded in influence psychology, specifically the concept of liking as presented by
Cialdini (2007).
In the remainder of this paper we present a more specific description of the
theoretical scenario, the simulation, and a designed experiment examining the impact of
some factors of interest on the behavior and opinions of individuals in a social landscape.
We discuss this approach, the results, and provide some conclusions and potential
avenues for advancing this research.

Scenario and Simulation Development
As in Epstein’s model, the scenario is a generic population of autonomous
individuals under the influence of some government with a specified degree of
legitimacy. Civilians move about the landscape and interact with one another, forming
friendships and sharing opinions on specific topics that aggregate to form grievance
against the government. They also may choose to become actively rebellious, depending
on their grievance and the perceived risk of being arrested. If they are actively rebellious,
they run the risk of being arrested by Cops. Cops move randomly about the landscape
arresting rebels as they find them.
This represents a generalizable social landscape, which can be validated by
comparing emergent behaviors to established sociological phenomena. The intent here is
not to accurately model any specific population or scenario; this has been attempted in
other models such as the Socio-Cultural Analysis Tool (S-CAT) (Murray, et al., 2011).
The result is an over-complicated system not generally trusted by decision-makers and
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therefore not used. Instead this model aims to find a parsimonious set of factors leading
to realistic behaviors of interest, in the spirit of GSS.
Software and Programming Considerations
The simulation itself is built within Repast Simphony 2.0 Beta (North, Howe,
Collier, & Vos, 2007). The underlying virtual space about which agents move is a 40 x
40 torus. The agents move in random order each tick of simulated time. Each patch has
a holding capacity of only one un-jailed Civilian or Cop. This prevents clustering of all
agents in very small geographical spaces and allows for much more effective
visualization, but it adds to the computational complexity significantly. To ameliorate
this issue, the software maintains a linked list of all empty patches that is polled when an
agent moves rather than polling all available patches and querying the number of agents
thereon. This significantly decreases processing time.
Similarly, the software maintains lists of all imprisoned Civilians, active rebels,
and peaceful Civilians. The simpler alternative is to always consider every civilian in
range and query their status. At the stage of development where this change was made,
run speed increased from 42 to 73 ticks per minute at population density of 0.70. At
population density 0.50, the change was from 58 to 76 ticks per minute, demonstrating
that the change diminished the difference in processing time induced by increasing the
number of agents. With any ABM, streamlining processing tasks is imperative.
Cop Logic
Cops are relatively simple agents performing two tasks directly: arresting active
rebels and moving about the landscape. Each Cop has identical vision and movement
range, designated copVision, which is set by the user. The logic is shown in Figure 2.
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The cop first searches the range of copVision for active rebels. If it finds any, it picks one
at random and arrests them. An arrest consists of setting the target Civilian’s status to
jailed, hiding them in the visualization, adding their occupied patch to the list of empty
patches, and pulling a jail term from a uniform distribution between 0 and the userspecified maximum jail term. For all simulations in this study, the maximum jail term is
30 ticks. If an arrest is made, the Cop moves to the location of the arrested Civilian;
otherwise, it moves to a randomly selected open patch within its range. If no patch is
open, it simply does not move.

Figure 2. Cop Logic Flow

Cops also serve as a source of information for Civilians, though they do not play
this role directly. Their presence in an area impacts the behavior of the Civilians that are
aware of the Cop’s presence. This role will be seen more in depth in the Civilian logic.
Civilian Logic
Civilians are far more complicated in their logic than Cops. The full logic is
shown in Figure 3. A Civilian is aware of its surrounding to a user-specified range,
designated civVision, and is capable of moving up to another user-specified range,
designated civRange. At the highest level, each turn that they are not jailed, a Civilian
moves about the landscape, makes a decision about whether to be actively rebellious,
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then communicates with another Civilian. If a Civilian is jailed, it simply checks if its
jail term is complete. If so, it moves to a random open patch and makes a decision about
its rebel status, and becomes visible.

Figure 3. Civilian logic flow

If the Civilian is not jailed and one or more Civilians within civVision is a friend,
one of those friends is chosen at random. The Civilian will then move to a random patch
within civRange that is closest to that friend. If there are no friends within civVision, the
Civilian moves to a random open patch within civRange, or stays still if there is no open
patch available.
Next, the Civilian decides if it should be actively rebellious. This logic is
equivalent to that in Epstein (2006). The Civilian counts both the number of Cops (C)
23

and the number of active rebels (A) within civVision and computes an estimated
probability of arrest (P),
𝑃 = 1−𝑒

𝐶
−2.3� �
𝐴 𝑐𝑖𝑣𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛

(1)

It then calculates net risk (N) by multiplying this probability by its risk tolerance (R), a
value between 0 and 1 which is held constant for each Civilian and drawn from a uniform
distribution,
𝑁 = 𝑅𝑃

(2)

If grievance is greater than net risk by at least a threshold value, designated
rebelThreshold and set to 0.1 in all simulations in this study, the Civilian will become an
active rebel. Otherwise, it will be inactive. In this way, the presence of Cops serves to
force rebellious Civilians into hiding, while the presence of other rebellious Civilians
serves to diminish this effect.
The value of grievance represents the sum of anti-government sentiment held by a
Civilian. In Epstein (2006), each Civilian drew a hardship value of 0 to 1 from a uniform
distribution and multiplied this by (1 − 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑦) to obtain grievance. To initialize,
this simulation draws a hardship value between 0 and 20 from a uniform integer
distribution and multiplies this by

1−legitimacy
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to obtain grievance. Hardship is

thereafter characterized using a genetic algorithm (GA) as described by Holland (1995).
This opinionGene is an array of 20 integers, each of which can take a value of 0 or 1.
Each index on the gene represents a single specific opinion. These opinions amalgamate
to form a concept of anti-government sentiment, which is scaled by (1 − 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑦)
to maintain cohesion to Epstein’s model. Thus,
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(3)

𝑖=1

These opinions can be modified by communication or by mutation, which occurs
with probability 0.01 at a random index during communication. This mutation is
necessary to avoid rendering an opinion extinct. The GA is used both because it is more
psychologically accurate than a single number, and because it prevents the simulation
from trending toward uniform grievance of 0.
The final part of a Civilian’s logic is communication. If there are other Civilians
in its Moore neighborhood, the eight patches bordering the agent, one of them is selected
at random as a target with whom to communicate. First, a topic of conversation is
chosen, represented by an index on the opinionGene. The target’s value on the
opinionGene is replaced by the source’s value. Next, the opinionGenes are compared. If
the proportion of the opinion gene where the two disagree is less than a threshold,
designated friendThreshold and held at 0.25 for this study, a non-directional friendship
link is generated between the two Civilians. This link will remain for the next 20 turns in
the absence of future communication.
Visualization
Analysis of ABMs often requires qualitative observation of trends in addition to
quantitative analysis, so appropriate visualization is vital. The visualization in this
simulation provides information of both the observable external state and the hidden
internal state. An example for reference is shown in Figure 4. The external state is
shown in the foreground. Civilians are represented by human stick figures colored red if
they are active rebels and blue otherwise, jailed Civilians are not shown, and Cops are
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represented by gold stars. The internal state of Civilians is shown in the background and
connecting arrows. Each line represents a friendship between two Civilians. The
background color is scaled from black, for low grievance of the occupying Civilian, to
red, for high grievance.
The screenshot in Figure 4 shows both qualitative findings from Epstein (2006)
remaining present in this simulation. First, there are quite a few Civilians with very high
levels of grievance acting deceptively in areas being patrolled by Cops, taking the role of
inactive Civilians. Second, a local breakout in rebellion is occurring where random
motion has left Civilians unaware of any Cops in the area. This kind of breakout is
temporally punctuated, with rebellion occurring in spikes at random intervals.

Figure 4. Screenshot of Simulation Portraying Civilians (People) Colored According to Whether
They Are Active Rebels (Red) or Not (Blue) Exhibiting Grievance (Background Scaled Black to Red),
Friendships (Lines), and Cops (Gold Stars)
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Experimental Design
Factors of Interest
The primary purpose of this experiment is to identify the relevant structural
variables that may affect the dynamics of rebellion in the simulation. Structural variables
expected to possibly have an effect are civilian range of vision (civVision), civilian range
of movement (civRange), cop range of vision (copVision), initial population density
(popDensity), and Cop density (copDensity). Population density is the proportion of
possible patches populated by Cops and/or Civilians at initialization, and Cop density is
the proportional size of the subpopulation that are Cops. These variables in the actual
system of a social landscape may be affected indirectly by geography or technology in
the case of range, and may simply vary by region in the case of densities.
A secondary purpose of this experiment is to determine whether the addition of
preference in movement toward friends has a discernible effect. The intent is to increase
psychological realism by creating social clusters, but any observed non-qualitative effects
would be useful to note.
The factors and their levels are summarized in Table 1. Other values such as
threshold values remain fixed because those values were fixed in Epstein (2006). The
intent is to remain aligned with the qualitative observations from Epstein’s model, which
are exhibited in the present model using the same values.
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Table 1. Factors and Levels Used in Experiment

Factor
A

Low Value Mid Value High Value

Civilian Range of Vision

1

4

7

B Civilian Range of Movement

1

4

7

C

Cop Range of Vision

1

4

7

D

Movement Toward Friends

No

N/A

Yes

E

Population Density

0.3

0.5

0.7

F

Cop Density

0.01

0.04

0.07

Response Variables
Four response variables allow for future comparison after implementing MISO
actions in the simulation. Each simulation run lasts for 300 ticks, and all observations are
made after every agent has acted in random order for a given tick.
The first two response variables, mean grievance and grievance variance, relate
to the distribution of grievance at the end of the simulation. For ease of interpretation,
grievance is recorded here as the sum of each element of the opinion gene, before
correcting for legitimacy. While at initialization grievance is distributed uniformly, it is
to be expected that as each element of the opinion gene becomes its own random
variable, grievance should tend toward a normal distribution. From prior investigation,
this is observed, so only the mean and variance of the grievance distribution are gathered.
The mean should not be affected by any factor, because there is no preference toward
either 0s or 1s with the exception of arrests occurring more often to civilians with high
grievance.
The remaining responses relate to the amount of rebellion observed under a set of
conditions. Rebel activity occurs in bursts under both realistic and simulated conditions,
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so a point observation is not appropriate (Epstein, 2006). Rather, the mean proportion of
Civilians in a given state over a period of time is appropriate. The first 100 steps are
omitted to allow for initialization of the simulation. Therefore, mean prisoner ratio is the
mean proportion of Civilians in prison over time steps 101-300, and mean rebel ratio is
the mean proportion of Civilians that are active rebels over time steps 101-300.
Design Type
This experiment is a full factorial 26 design with 2 replications and 4 center points

for each value of factor D, the inclusion of friendship rules, for a total of 136 replications.

Fractional factorials would have allowed fewer data points, but complex adaptive systems
are defined by nonlinearity and the assumption that high-order effects would be nonsignificant is not likely to be met.

Results
Grievance Distribution
As expected, no factors or interactions have a significant effect upon mean
grievance. The observed mean grievance is 9.91, with variance 0.1813. Some factors
and interactions affect variance as discussed below.
A natural logarithm transformation sufficed to normalize residuals in analysis of
the grievance variance. The resulting ANOVA is shown in Table 2. Three factors, and
every possible interaction between them, affect the variance: Civilian vision range (A),
Cop vision range (C), and Cop Density (F). These are each significant with 𝑝 < 0.0001,
and jointly they are significant with 𝑝 < 0.05. Pure quadratic curvature is also
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statistically significant with 𝑝 = 0.0013, but it is not practically significant with a sum of
squares less than 5% that of the next smallest effect.

Table 2. ANOVA for ln(grievance variance)

Source

Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square F Value

p-value

Model

13.18662

7

1.883803

478.54

< 0.0001

A

1.469471

1

1.469471

373.29

< 0.0001

C

3.508438

1

3.508438

891.25

< 0.0001

F

2.632555

1

2.632555

668.75

< 0.0001

AC

1.474048

1

1.474048

374.45

< 0.0001

AF

1.445637

1

1.445637

367.23

< 0.0001

CF

1.443684

1

1.443684

366.74

< 0.0001

ACF

1.212792

1

1.212792

308.08

< 0.0001

Curvature

0.04288

1

0.04288

10.89

0.0013

Residual

0.499942

127

0.003937

Lack of Fit

0.21387

57

0.003752

0.92

0.6286

Pure Error

0.286073

70

0.004087

Total

13.72945

135

Mean Prisoner Ratio
A power transformation with 𝜆 = 0.3 resulted in normalization of residuals for

mean prisoner ratio. ANOVA results are shown in Table 3. Five factors and nine

interactions achieve joint significance 𝑝 < 0.05, and two interactions are included in
analysis for hierarchy. Significant effects are Civilian vision range (A), Civilian

movement range (B), Cop vision range (C), population density (E), Cop density (F), AC,
AE, AF, CE, CF, ACF, AEF, CEF, and ACEF. Note that the factors having greatest
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effects are again A, C, F, and every interaction between them. Pure quadratic curvature
is also significant with 𝑝 < 0.0001, but it does not dominate.

Table 3. ANOVA for (mean prisoner ratio)0.3

Source

Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square F Value

Model

5.042679

16

0.315167

892.07

A

1.426079

1

1.426079

4036.47 < 0.0001

B

0.005433

1

0.005433

C

2.823678

1

2.823678

E

0.006652

1

0.006652

18.83

< 0.0001

F

0.301663

1

0.301663

853.85

< 0.0001

AC

0.048534

1

0.048534

137.37

< 0.0001

AE

0.010434

1

0.010434

29.53

< 0.0001

AF

0.301018

1

0.301018

852.02

< 0.0001

CE

0.008973

1

0.008973

25.40

< 0.0001

CF

0.017255

1

0.017255

48.84

< 0.0001

EF

0.000118

1

0.000118

0.33

0.5650

ACE

0.000327

1

0.000327

0.93

0.3380

ACF

0.073941

1

0.073941

209.29

< 0.0001

AEF

0.006949

1

0.006949

19.67

< 0.0001

CEF

0.003076

1

0.003076

8.71

0.0038

ACEF

0.008549

1

0.008549

24.20

< 0.0001

Curvature

0.049834

1

0.049834

141.05

< 0.0001

Residual

0.041689

118

0.000353

Lack of Fit

0.018711

48

0.00039

1.19

0.2529

Pure Error

0.022978

70

0.000328

Total

5.134203

135
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15.38

p-value
< 0.0001

0.0001

7992.32 < 0.0001

Mean Rebel Ratio
A natural logarithm transformation achieved normalized residuals with mean
rebel ratio. ANOVA results are shown in Table 4. Civilian vision range (A), Cop vision
range (C), population density (E), and cop density (F), and interactions AC, AE, AF, CE,
CF, EF, ACF, AEF, and CEF have effects individually significant with 𝑝 < 0.0001 and
jointly significant with 𝑝 < 0.05. Pure quadratic curvature is small but statistically

significant with 𝑝 < 0.0001.

Table 4. ANOVA for ln(mean rebel ratio)

Source

Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

F Value

p-value

Model

449.6666

13

34.58974

588.56

< 0.0001

A

83.15574

1

83.15574

1414.94

< 0.0001

C

53.91509

1

53.91509

917.39

< 0.0001

E

20.22047

1

20.22047

344.06

< 0.0001

F

201.6595

1

201.6595

3431.35

< 0.0001

AC

7.098212

1

7.098212

120.78

< 0.0001

AE

10.26187

1

10.26187

174.61

< 0.0001

AF

28.39973

1

28.39973

483.24

< 0.0001

CE

1.112586

1

1.112586

18.93

< 0.0001

CF

27.58989

1

27.58989

469.46

< 0.0001

EF

7.816607

1

7.816607

133.00

< 0.0001

ACF

4.416607

1

4.416607

75.15

< 0.0001

AEF

2.138198

1

2.138198

36.38

< 0.0001

CEF

1.882091

1

1.882091

32.02

< 0.0001

Curvature

1.110018

1

1.110018

18.89

< 0.0001

Residual

7.111144

121

0.05877

Lack of Fit

3.217693

51

0.063092

1.13

0.3095

Pure Error

3.893452

70

0.055621

Total

457.8878

135
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Discussion
As expected, mean grievance was not affected by any factors, though surprisingly
the expected value of the mean is slightly less than 10. The 95% confidence interval for
the mean is (9.84, 9.98). This slight shift away from high grievance is likely a result of
arrests removing civilians with highly aggrieved opinions from the communication pool.
The remaining responses each had significant curvature, both pure quadratic and
interaction, including the effects of every factor except for D, the enabling of preferential
movement toward friends. There is, however, an observable qualitative effect as clusters
of like-minded Civilians flow into and out of existence in a replication. There may be an
effect under MISO influence, but the qualitative effect (clustering) has no effect upon
these quantitative responses without external influence. Removing factor D from
analysis projects the design to a 25 full factorial design with 4 replications and 8 center

points. Factor B, the movement range of civilians, was non-significant for all but mean
prisoner ratio, and in that response it had a weak effect with no interactions. In the
original Epstein model, movement and vision range of civilians were a single value, so
this finding supports his formulation.
Pure quadratic curvature is modeled and found to be statistically significant, but
no axial runs are made to better estimate the effect. In such a generalized model, there is
no reason to estimate these effects unless they appear to have a practical effect upon
interpretation. The effect of pure curvature in each response is small compared to the
other factors modeled.
By the nature of this experiment, which is exploratory, there is no one set of “best
results,” but two outcomes seem interesting to explore: maximizing rebellion while
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minimizing imprisonment, and minimizing rebellion while also minimizing variance of
grievance.
The former result represents the optimal conditions for successful rebellious
activity. Using a desirability function with equal weight given to each response, we find
that this condition occurs when all vision and range variables are low, population density
is low, and Cop density is low. As seen in Figure 5, created using JMP 9.0.1, this results
in mean rebel density of 0.2457 and mean prisoner density of 0.0065. Interestingly,
statistical prediction of rebellion in countries has led to the finding that the presence of
mountainous terrain is predictive of rebellion (O'Brien, 2010). This analysis suggests a
set of possible underlying factors, as well as possible ways to counteract this seemingly
unavoidable effect. By increasing range of vision for civilians and cops, perhaps by
encouraging the development of internet technology or mass transit, it may be possible to
decrease rebel activity in such regions without moving mountains.

Figure 5. Prediction profile for rebel-optimal scenario

34

The latter result represents the optimal conditions for government: non-rebellious
citizens who have a low prevalence of extremist opinions regarding the government.
Using a desirability function with equal weight given to each response, we find that this
condition occurs when Civilian vision is high, Cop vision is low, and Cop and population
densities are high. As seen in Figure 6, created again using JMP 9.0.1, this results in
mean rebel ratio of 0.0027 and grievance variance of 5.013. Low Cop vision is
surprising; one might expect the ability to quickly imprison any rebels would be helpful
in decreasing the presence of rebels, but that appears not to be the case. High Civilian
vision is more intuitive; this increases the probability of civilians observing Cops and
therefore having their rebellious tendencies counteracted by the chance of being arrested.
This suggests that a highly effective police force need only have a reputation of
effectiveness, be visible, and exist in large numbers.

Figure 6. Prediction profile for government-optimal scenario
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Future research should include analysis of changes in responses due to externally
introduced factors, such as potential MISO plans in both the presence and absence of prorebel tactics. These can be introduced by defining and populating a new class of agent
that exists outside of the original logic. Much can also be added in the form of
psychological realism. Influence psychology suggests ways to increase the realism of
friendships, as well as introduce new relationships that influence interactions. For
examples, see Cialdini (2007).

Conclusion
Use of a designed experiment on the results of an Agent-Based Model (ABM)
shows that a simplified form of communication and influence between agents is sufficient
to generate realistic patterns of rebellion and suggest underlying factors that influence
empirically observed but unexplained phenomena. This model represents both a proof of
concept for a generative social science (GSS) approach to MISO effects analysis and a
virtual test bed within which psychological experiments can be performed with complete
control of external factors and no ethical restrictions. Expansion of this technique may
provide MISO operators with unbiased forecasting of effects to use in operations
planning.
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III. Forecasting Effects of MISO Actions: An ABM Methodology
Introduction
In the last decade, the United States has found herself fighting wars on a
battlespace she has little expertise with: the hearts and minds of populations whose
support can make or break a campaign. This sort of campaign relies heavily upon
Military Information Support Operations (MISO), operations whose purpose is “to
induce, influence, or reinforce the perceptions, attitudes, reasoning, and behavior of
individuals, foreign leaders, groups, and organizations in a manner advantageous to US
forces and objectives” (Department of the Air Force, 2011, p. 2).
MISO is a difficult task. The effects are nearly impossible to measure due to
confounding nuisance factors outside of the operators’ control, and experimentation is not
ethically viable. Therefore, forecasting of effects has traditionally relied upon subject
matter experts armed with sophisticated intelligence products (Department of the Air
Force, 2005). This research develops an agent-based model (ABM) of civil rebellion in a
generalized population and allows experimentation using MISO agents to compare
effects of different strategies.
This paper begins with a brief background on social simulation, with a focus on
ABM, followed by an overview of the base simulation. A hypothetical application
scenario is then presented, with comparison of options that may be available to the MISO
planner. Results and analysis are discussed as well as a broad range of potential avenues
for future research.
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Background
ABM of sociological phenomena is not new; one of the first ABMs examined
racial segregation in housing (Schelling, 1971). Advances in computer processing have
enabled greater use of this technique in the last two decades. Epstein and Axtell’s (1996)
Sugarscape marked the beginning of a research paradigm termed Generative Social
Science (GSS). The key desideratum of GSS is the use of the simplest possible set of
rules to explain an emergent behavior of interest (Epstein, 2006).
GSS has gained popularity as a methodology, and examples of its application can
be found in many of the social sciences including economics (Zhang, Li, Xiong, &
Zhang, 2010; Roozmand, Ghasem-Aghaee, Hofstede, Nematbakhsh, Baraani, &
Verwaart, 2011), archaeology (Epstein, 2006), and sociology (Gorman, Mezic, Mezic, &
Gruenewald, 2006; Mäs, Flache, & Helbing, 2010). In psychology, Epstein (2006)
generated thoughtless application of norms in an ABM and Willer, Macy, and Kuwabara
(2009) supported this with laboratory experiments showing support of norms that
disagree with personal beliefs. This demonstrates the potential for GSS and traditional
experimentation to augment each other.
Epstein’s (2006) civil violence model serves as the basis for our model. As
presented in detail in Chapter 2, we expand on Epstein’s work to add communication
between civilians and movement that is more grounded in influence psychology,
specifically the concept of liking as presented by Cialdini (2007).
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Civil Rebellion Simulation
In order to be generalizable across situations, this social environment cannot be
modeled after any individual nation or culture. Rather, fields are provided that can be
manipulated to better reflect a given culture. Values in those fields are set here to those
used by Epstein (2006), those found to be of average response in Chapter 2, or those of
observed global averages. Where the deviation is not intentional, we adhere as closely as
possible to Epstein’s model. This serves as a form of verification and validation; we
maintain every qualitative trait observed in his analysis.
Note that the strength of this abstraction is an appropriate comparison between
treatments, rather than actual forecasting of specific levels of rebellion or antigovernment sentiment. To accomplish the latter, every variable that affects rebellions
would have to be accounted for, which would make for a very complicated and overspecified model.
All programming is done using Repast Simphony 2.0 Beta (North, Howe, Collier,
& Vos, 2007). An image of the simulation is shown in Figure 7. Two types of agents are
interacting in the basic social landscape: Civilians and Cops. MISO agents are later
added for experimentation.
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Figure 7. Screenshot of Simulation Portraying Civilians (People) Colored According to Whether
They Are Active Rebels (Red) or Not (Blue) Exhibiting Grievance (Background Scaled Black to Red),
Friendships (Lines), and Cops (Gold Stars)

Civilian Behavior
Civilians are represented by people in the visualization, and their logic is shown
in Figure 8. The level of grievance felt toward the government is represented as
opinionGene in the manner of a genetic algorithm as introduced by Holland (1995).
Overall grievance is considered the mean value of 20 individual memes within the
opinionGene, each represented by a binary digit, scaled down by the legitimacy of the
government, which is static in this analysis at 0.82. That is,
20

1
𝐺𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = � � 𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑖 � (1 − 𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑦)
20
𝑖=1

40

(4)

For ease of presentation, we refer instead to grievance as
′

20

𝐺𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = � 𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑖

(5)

𝑖=1

Figure 8. Civilian Logic Flow

After a civilian moves to a randomly chosen empty block within its movement
range, it examines its surroundings and decides whether it should become actively
rebellious. To do so, it counts both the number of cops (C) and the number of active
rebels (A) in its vision range (civVision) and computes an estimated probability of arrest
(P) (Epstein, 2006),
𝑃 = 1−𝑒

𝐶
−2.3� �
𝐴 𝑐𝑖𝑣𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
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(6)

It then calculates net risk (N) by multiplying this probability by its risk tolerance (R),
𝑁 = 𝑅𝑃

(7)

If the difference between grievance and N exceeds a threshold (rebelThreshold), set here
to 0.1, the Civilian will become an active rebel. Otherwise, it will remain inactive.
After choosing a state, a civilian will randomly choose a civilian from its Moore
neighborhood, the eight bordering patches, with whom to communicate. A random topic,
or index of the opinion gene, is chosen to discuss, and if the two civilians’ opinions
differ, the target civilian will change their opinion. If the 1-norm distance between the
civilians’ opinion genes is less than 25% of the possible difference, a friendship will be
formed, and for the next 20 ticks the two civilians will prefer to move toward each other.
There is also a 1% chance of a mutation, the alteration of a random opinion within the
source’s opinion gene. This prohibits opinions from going extinct over time.
Cop Behavior
Cops are far simpler than Civilians, as shown by their logic flow in Figure 9.
Before moving, a Cop examines the blocks within its vision looking for active rebels. If
it sees any, it moves to one of their locations and arrests that rebel for a random period of
time between 1 and 30 steps. Arrested Civilians cannot be seen and remain static for the
duration of their term. If there are no rebels within the Cop’s vision, it will randomly
move to an empty block within its vision.
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Figure 9. Cop Logic Flow

MISO Agents
MISO agents are those added into the base simulation as described above for the
purpose of experimentation. Here we have coded an agent whose behavior can be
modified to act in many roles by modifying variable values. These agents have limited
effectiveness depending on their affiliation (government or rebel), government
legitimacy, their media (written or internet), range of influence (commRange), the
number of opinions about which they communicate (commBreadth), and the number of
contacts that can be made in a turn (commAttempts). Two forms of this agent are used in
this case study: a pamphlet distributor and an internet campaigner. The values associated
with each are shown in Table 5.
Table 5. Variable values for two types of MISO agents

Variable

Pamphlet Distributor

Internet Campaigner

Affiliation

Government/Rebel

Government/Rebel

Susceptible Population

Literate Civilians

Web-connected Civilians

commRange

3

40

commBreadth

[1, 20]

[1, 20]

commAttempts

10

10
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Every turn, this agent chooses a target list of size commAttempts within range
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 from those susceptible to its influence. For each target on this list, one of

the commBreadth topics to which they are assigned is chosen, and the target’s opinion on
that topic is set, if rebel, to 1 with probability (1 − 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑦) , or if government, to 0
with probability (𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑦) . Agents with written messages may only affect literate

Civilians, and agents with internet messages may only affect web-connected Civilians.

Generally, internet range is also unlimited, which is modeled using 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 = 40
rather than the pamphlet range of 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 = 3 .
Application
In this analysis, we pose a hypothetical scenario in which an area we are
interested in is being affected by a rebel pamphlet-based propaganda campaign. In this
hypothetical case, the area of interest has been modeled in the past, and the values laid
out in Table 6 seem to have produced appropriate responses, so they are assumed as
ground truth. Note that these values correspond to those used in center runs in Chapter 2.
Literacy and internet connectivity rates for the global average are used and taken from the
CIA World Factbook (2012), but country-specific values could be found in the same
manner. The rebel propaganda campaign is reported to have a moderate level of focus,
equivalent to 25% of possible anti-government topics. Thus, commBreadth is set to 5 for
the rebel agent.
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Table 6. Values used in simulation for application scenario

Variable Name
civVision
civRange
copVision
popDensity
copDensity
legitimacy
literacy
connectivity

Value
4
4
4
0.5
0.04
0.82
0.84
0.30

Due to budget and political constraints, only one counter-rebel campaign may be
implemented. Two possibilities are pamphlet campaigns and internet campaigns with
pro-government information. The determination of message focus is left to the MISO
planner. The goal is to minimize Civilians’ mean grievance.
Note that the purpose of this experiment is to demonstrate how this tool could be
used by a MISO campaigner. There would almost certainly be changes to the grievance
response if legitimacy, literacy, and connectivity were changed, but we assume for the
purposes of this experiment that these factors are fixed.
Information Medium
To determine the optimal medium for information, we performed 20 replications,
each of length 500 ticks, split equally between each of four conditions: no response,
pamphlet campaign, internet campaign, and both campaigns. All MISO agents for this
analysis used commBreadth of 5, which is equivalent to the rebel pamphleteer. While the
use of both campaigns has been determined not to be a choice, it may be interesting for
the decision-maker to see the effect that may have. Averaging the mean grievance at
each time step, we find the results in Figure 10. There is no clearly optimal medium for
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communicating the pro-government message. If the goal has a short-term focus, the
pamphlet campaign serves as the most effective response to the rebel message; if the
focus is more long-term, the internet campaign serves as the most effective. The
cumulative effect of introducing both campaigns is certainly stronger than either
campaign alone. As shown in Figure 11, this translates to decreased rebellious activity,
though the higher noise in this variable obscures the short-term difference between
pamphlet and internet responses.

Figure 10. Civilian Grievance Response to Pro-Government Information Campagins
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Figure 11. Civilian Rebellion Response to Pro-Government Information Campaigns

Topical Focus
Because neither medium was ruled out in the first experiment, we performed
another experiment for both pamphlet and internet campaigns. We expected significant
curvature in the effect of message breadth, so we performed 2 runs at each level of
breadth (every integer in [1, 20]) for each medium, for a total of 80 replications. The
effect is not statistically significant early in a run. At tick 100, where the difference
between internet and pamphlet responses was greatest, there is no evidence of breadth
affecting grievance.
At tick 500, there is strong evidence (𝑝 < 0.0001) of a negative linear effect of

breadth upon grievance. There is insufficient evidence to show that this effect differs
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between treatments. Breadth and campaign type explain 44.4% of variance in grievance.
The majority of observed variance, then, is attributable simply to noise, as nothing else is
altered between runs. The associated ANOVA is shown in Table 7.
Table 7. ANOVA for Breadth Effect on Grievance

Source

DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio p-value
Model
2
9.031941
4.51597
30.73
<.0001
Type
1
2.616809
2.616809
7.8067 <.0001
Breadth
1
6.415132
6.415132
43.6533 <.0001
Error
77
11.31564
0.14696
Lack Of Fit 37
6.071054
0.164083
1.2514 0.2434
Pure Error 40
5.244583
0.131115
Total
79
20.34758

Recommendations
Based on the analysis of our selected hypothetical scenario and parameter settings
used, we would recommend to the decision-maker to use a broad-themed internet
campaign for long-term effect on civilian support for the government. For a short-term
effect, breadth is inconsequential, but we would recommend a pamphlet campaign.

Conclusion
The intent of this paper is not to inform a decision-maker; instead, this
demonstrates the flexibility of using an agent-based model to compare MISO actions in
silica. Real-world effects are more complicated and difficult or impossible to measure,
so this technique offers insight into subtle effects that are otherwise hidden. Furthermore,
as we begin to better understand the effects of different variables, the number of runs, and
therefore analyst time, required for proper analysis may decrease. Case in point: the
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curvature expected in the effect of message breadth was not found. Far less data could
have been collected to analyze the effect of breadth.
Much future research can be considered. As alluded to in the scenario, the results
of this model currently possess only face validity. It would be interesting to attempt
validating for a certain area of interest. Even altering only literacy and web-connectivity
to match a particular region would be illuminating.
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IV. Conclusion
Research Summary
This thesis develops an agent-based model (ABM) of a human social landscape as
a technique for understanding the impact of structural factors and external factors on antigovernment rebellion. The model is built in the spirit of generative social science, with a
focus on rule simplicity and successful generation of realistic outcomes. It adds to the
base of published work by modeling opinion with a genetic algorithm, which allows for
sustainable variation in beliefs, and by examining the addition of elements from influence
psychology.
In Chapter 2, a factorial experiment examined environmental effects and found
that the addition of friendship behavior as modeled had no quantitative effect on Civilian
opinion. This suggests that it may be an extraneous agent rule for future work, and it
supports the arguments for simplicity in generative social science. Other environmental
factors, such as range of vision and population density, had significant primary and
interaction effects. These results agree with real-world observations. This type of
analysis serves as a proof of concept for ABM in forecasting a region’s proclivity to
rebel.
In Chapter 3, a hypothetical application from the perspective of a MISO planner
was presented, with results suggesting that while written propaganda in a limited area is
effective for short-term moderation of opinions, internet-based propaganda may be more
effective for a long-term effect. Furthermore, the results suggest that a broader message
is more effective than a narrowly focused message, though this effect only becomes
noticeable over longer periods of time. This analysis serves as a proof of concept for
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application of ABM to comparing MISO plans to prevent, or possibly encourage,
rebellions by moderating anti-government sentiment.

Future Work
Generative social science is a young methodology, and the base of published
work implementing it remains small. The subset of that work that is focused on MISO
planning is sparse, so there is ample opportunity for further investigation into this field.
This simulation itself could be improved upon, and its capabilities could be further
examined and validated.
While the addition of friendship behavior had no significant effect, there is a
plethora of additional social psychology that could be applied to Civilian agent behavior.
Much of this is explored in Chapter 1. Only two of the six major concepts defining
interpersonal persuasion as presented in Cialdini (2007) are implemented here. Social
proof is present when a Civilian is more likely to become actively rebellious when it can
see others that are active, and liking is present in the application of friendship.
Commitment and consistency could be implemented by increasing or decreasing the rebel
threshold depending on present state; the agent would be less likely to change states.
Reciprocation, authority, and scarcity could be added by modifying the social
scenario. For example, adding states of employment that lead to borrowing and lending
behavior could introduce an avenue for reciprocation. An agent may be more likely to
become actively rebellious after accepting a loan from another rebel. Changing the
strength of reciprocity based on agent wealth would implement the scarcity principle.
Also, by adding additional familial relationships, which would necessitate agent births
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and deaths, social structure could be made more rigid. This would allow the simulation
of authority.
Adding more social psychological principles into the model would also enable
greater regional specification. The model presented in this thesis is intentionally
generalized, but a user may wish for a model to be specifiable to a region. Each of the
influence effects may be altered in strength depending on a culture’s GLOBE values, as
discussed by House et al. (2004). In this manner the effects of culture could be
measured, and effects specific to a single culture could be examined with greater
accuracy.
In order to truly validate the results of this model, it would probably have to be
specified to a region of interest. One possible methodology for regional specification is
the use of GLOBE values as discussed above, but another is to build a more descriptive
response surface than that explored in Chapter 2. With a response surface examining
every major input in the model, sets of input variables could be identified that would
generate responses, such as rebellion and prison rates, observed in a region. Subject
matter expert involvement would be necessary to identify which sets of inputs are
realistic. With this “backward-validated” simulation, forecasts of MISO effects would be
more directly applicable and compared to real-world observations.
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Appendix A. Code for UserGlobalsAndPanelFactory.groovy
1 package civilviolence.relogo
2
3 import repast.simphony.relogo.factories.AbstractReLogoGlobalsAndPanelFactory
4
5 public class UserGlobalsAndPanelFactory extends AbstractReLogoGlobalsAndPanelFactory{
6
public void addGlobalsAndPanelComponents(){
7
8
addReLogoTickCountDisplay()
9
10
//User Interface
11
addButtonWL("setup","Setup")
12
//Press to initialize a replication
13
addButtonWL("go","Step")
14
//Press to advance time one tick
15
addToggleButtonWL("go","Go")
16
//Press to advance time continually, press again to stop
17
addToggleButtonWL("goDOE", "Go DOE-style")
18
//Press to replicate the experiment from Chapter 2
19
addToggleButtonWL("goMISOpt1", "Go MISO experiment, part 1")
20
//Press to replicate experiment 1, Chapter 3
21
addToggleButtonWL("goMISOpt2", "Go MISO experiment, part 2")
22
//Press to replicate experiment 2, Chapter 3
23
addSliderWL("civVision", "Civilian Vision", 0, 0.5, 10, 7)
24
addSliderWL("civRange", "Civilian Move Range", 0, 0.5, 10, 4)
25
addSliderWL("copVision", "Cop Vision and Range", 0, 0.5, 10, 7)
26
addSliderWL("literacy", "Literacy", 0, 0.01, 1, 0.84)
27
addSliderWL("connectivity", "Web Use", 0, 0.01, 1, 0.30)
28
addSliderWL("numRebPamphlets", "Number of Rebel Pamphleters", 0, 1, 5, 0)
29
addSliderWL("numGovPamphlets", "Number of Govvy Pamphleters", 0, 1, 5, 0)
30
addSliderWL("numRebWebCampaigns", "Number of Rebel Web Campaigns", 0, 1, 5, 0)
31
addSliderWL("numGovWebCampaigns", "Number of Govvy Web Campaigns", 0, 1, 5, 0)
32
addSliderWL("rebBreadth", "Breadth of Rebel MISO Campaign", 1, 1, 20, 5)
33
addSliderWL("govBreadth", "Breadth of Govvy MISO Campaign", 1, 1, 20, 5)
34
addSwitchWL("unlimitedJailTerm", "Kill rather than Imprison")
35
//Jailed Civilians are never released while checked
36
addSwitchWL("disableComm", "Disable communication between agents")
37
//Communication does not occur while checked
38
addSwitchWL("disableMoveTowardFriends", "Do not move toward friends")
39
//Friendships form but movement is random while checked
40
addMonitorWL("totalRebs", "Active Rebels", 1)
41
//Monitor to allow observation of rebel population
42
addMonitorWL("prisoners", "Prisoners", 1)
43
//Monitor to allow observation of jailed population
44
addMonitorWL("meanGrievance", "Mean Grievance", 1)
45
//Monitor for mean grievance of all Civilians
46
47
//Global variables
48
addGlobal("legitimacy", 0.82)
49
//Government legitimacy, from Epstein (2006)
50
addGlobal("maxJailTerm", 30)
51
//Jail terms drawn from uniform distribution between 1 and this value
52
addGlobal("copDensity", 0.04)
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53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79 }

//Proportion of popDensity to be designated as Cops
addGlobal("popDensity", 0.70)
//Proportion of all patches to be populated with Cops or Civilians
addGlobal("rebelThreshold", 0.1)
//Threshold for going active, taken from Epstein (2006)
addGlobal("k", 2.3)
//Arrest constant, from Epstein (2006)
addGlobal("emptyPatches")
//List of empty patches to be updated
addGlobal("inactives")
//List of inactive civilians
addGlobal("actives")
//List of active civilians
addGlobal("prisoners")
//List of jailed rebels
addGlobal("literates")
//List of literate civilians
addGlobal("webUsers")
//List of civilians connected to the internet
addGlobal("friendThreshold", 0.25)
//This is later multiplied by (1-legitimacy)
addGlobal("friendLife", 20)
//How long a friendship lasts without interaction
addGlobal("maxTicks", 500)
//Ticks per replication
}
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Appendix B. Code for UserObserver.groovy
1 package civilviolence.relogo
2
3 import com.sun.jndi.ldap.Filter;
4 import com.sun.org.apache.xpath.internal.operations.Mod;
5
6 import static repast.simphony.relogo.Utility.*;
7 import static repast.simphony.relogo.UtilityG.*;
8 import repast.simphony.relogo.BaseObserver;
9 import repast.simphony.relogo.Stop;
10 import repast.simphony.relogo.Utility;
11 import repast.simphony.relogo.UtilityG;
12
13 class UserObserver extends BaseObserver{
14
15
//methods for Panel Factory
16
def relogoRun = 0
17
def timestamp() {ticks()}
18
def totalCops() {numCops} //number of Cops, does not change within
replication
19
def totalCivs() {numCivilians} //number of Civilians of all statuses, does not
change within replication
20
def totalRebs() {count(actives)} //number of active rebels in the model,
changes with time
21
def prisoners() {count(prisoners)} //number of jailed Civilians, changes with
time
22
def grievanceHistogram() { //Captures how many Civilians have each value of
grievance
23
def histogram = new ArrayList([0] * 21)
24
for (i in 0..20) {
25
histogram[i] = count(civilians().with({grievance == i / 20 * (1 legitimacy)}))
26
}
27
histogram
28
}
29
def meanGrievance() { //Captures the mean grievance of all Civilians, changes
with time
30
def sumGrievance = 0
31
foreach({sumGrievance += it.grievance * 20 / (1 - legitimacy)}, civilians())
32
sumGrievance / numCivilians
33
}
34
35
//variables
36
def totalSize //Total number of patches
37
def numCivilians //Total number of Civilians
38
def numCops //Total number of Cops
39
40
//methods
41
def setup() { //Run to initialize a replication
42
43
relogoRun++
44
clearAll()
45
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46
47
48
49
50
51
52

//Variable Setup
totalSize = (maxPxcor - minPxcor + 1) * (maxPycor - minPycor + 1)
numCivilians = round(popDensity * (1 - copDensity) * totalSize)
numCops = round(copDensity * popDensity * totalSize)
emptyPatches = new LinkedList(patches().toList()) //All patches are empty
assert count(emptyPatches) == totalSize //Verification assertion
friendThreshold = friendThreshold * (1-legitimacy) //Scale friend threshold to
same scale as grievance
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54
55
56

populateAgents() //Initially create Civilians and Cops
setUpLists() //Initialize inactive, active, prisoner, literate, and
web-connected lists

57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93

implementMISO() //Place MISO agents - change this method to change values
initializeAgents() //Set Civilian and Cop attributes, place them and MISO,
initial rebel decisions
checkAssertions() //Verification assertions
}
def go() { //Running once corresponds to a tick
tick()
ask(turtles()) { //Random order step for all Civilians, Cops, and MISO Agents
step()
}
ask(patches()) { //Update background color
checkColor()
}
ask(relationships()) { //If a relationship reaches max age, it dies
step()
}
checkAssertions() //Verification assertions
}
def goDOE() {
//Note: this method replicates the experiment from Chapter 2. Random order is
unnecessary but still completed.
if(timestamp() == 0 && relogoRun == 0) {
civVision = 7
civRange = 7
copVision = 7
disableMoveTowardFriends = true
popDensity = 0.7
copDensity = 0.07
setup()
maxTicks = 300
} else if(timestamp() == maxTicks) {
assert relogoRun < 136
if([2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,8, 9, 12, 16, 17, 27, 28, 30, 33, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 43,
47, 49, 53, 54, 55, 57, 59, 60, 62, 63, 65, 68, 71, 72, 73, 78, 79,
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94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101

102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117

118
119
120
121
122
123

124
125
126
127
128

80, 83, 90, 93, 94, 95, 98, 102, 103, 108, 111, 112, 113, 114,
115, 116, 118, 120, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 133, 134,
136].contains(relogoRun + 1)) {
civVision = 1
} else if ([14,23,52,61,76,81,121,131].contains(relogoRun + 1)) {
civVision = 4
} else {
civVision = 7
}
if([2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 28, 30, 33, 36, 38, 42,
45, 47, 49, 50, 51, 53, 58, 64, 67, 70, 72, 73, 77, 78, 80, 82, 83,
84, 85, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 106, 107,
108, 112, 115, 1 16, 119, 122, 123, 124, 125, 127, 132,
134].contains(relogoRun + 1)) {
civRange = 1
} else if ([14,23,52,61,76,81,121,131].contains(relogoRun + 1)) {
civRange = 4
} else {
civRange = 7
}
if([2, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15, 17, 21, 25, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 37, 39,
40, 45, 46, 47, 50, 54, 57, 58, 59, 66, 67, 70, 72, 73, 75, 77, 78,
79, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89, 91, 93, 95, 98, 101, 108, 109, 110,
112, 113, 115, 118, 122, 123, 128, 130, 134, 135,
136].contains(relogoRun + 1)) {
copVision = 1
} else if ([14,23,52,61,76,81,121,131].contains(relogoRun + 1)) {
copVision = 4
} else {
copVision = 7
}
if([1, 2, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31,
35, 39, 43, 44, 45, 49, 50, 51, 53, 58, 61, 64, 65, 67, 68, 71, 72,
73, 75, 76, 79, 80, 82, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 93, 95, 96, 97, 100,
102, 106, 107, 109, 116, 117, 120, 126, 128, 130, 131, 133, 134,
135, 136].contains(relogoRun + 1)) {
disableMoveTowardFriends = true
} else {
disableMoveTowardFriends = false
}
if([2, 5, 10, 12, 17, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 38, 39, 41, 43, 44, 46,
47, 49, 51, 55, 57, 58, 60, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72, 74, 78, 86,
88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 98, 99, 101, 102, 105, 107, 108,
109, 112, 113, 118, 119, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 129, 130,
135].contains(relogoRun + 1)) {
popDensity = 0.3
} else if ([14,23,52,61,76,81,121,131].contains(relogoRun + 1)) {
popDensity = 0.5
} else {
popDensity = 0.7
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129
130
131

132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177

}
if([4, 9, 12, 13, 15, 17, 21, 22, 24, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 38, 43, 44, 45,
47, 48, 49, 51, 54, 58, 59, 60, 62, 64, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 77,
78, 80, 82, 83, 89, 92, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 106, 111,
113, 117, 122, 124, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 132, 133, 135,
136].contains(relogoRun + 1)) {
copDensity = 0.01
} else if ([14,23,52,61,76,81,121,131].contains(relogoRun + 1)) {
copDensity = 0.04
} else {
copDensity = 0.07
}
setup()
} else {
go()
}
}

def goMISOpt1() {
//Note: This method replicates the experiment for message medium, Chapter 3
if(timestamp() == 0 && relogoRun == 0) {
civVision = 4
civRange = 4
copVision = 4
disableMoveTowardFriends = false
popDensity = 0.5
copDensity = 0.04
numRebPamphlets = 1
numGovPamphlets = 0
numRebWebCampaigns = 0
numGovWebCampaigns = 0
rebBreadth = 5
govBreadth = 5
maxTicks = 500
setup()
} else if(timestamp() == maxTicks) {
if (relogoRun == 5) {
numGovPamphlets = 1
} else if (relogoRun == 10) {
numGovPamphlets = 0
numGovWebCampaigns = 1
} else if (relogoRun == 15) {
numGovPamphlets = 1
} else if (relogoRun == 20) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("MISO part 1 run
complete.")
}
setup()
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179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230

} else {
go()
}
}
def goMISOpt2() {
//Note: this method replicates the experiment for breadth, Chapter 3
if(timestamp() == 0 && relogoRun == 0) {
civVision = 4
civRange = 4
copVision = 4
disableMoveTowardFriends = false
popDensity = 0.5
copDensity = 0.04
numRebPamphlets = 1
numGovPamphlets = 1
numRebWebCampaigns = 0
numGovWebCampaigns = 0
rebBreadth = 5
govBreadth = 1
setup()
} else if(timestamp() == maxTicks) {
if (mod(relogoRun,2) == 0 & relogoRun != 40 & relogoRun < 80) {
govBreadth ++
} else if (relogoRun == 40) {
numGovPamphlets = 0
numGovWebCampaigns = 1
govBreadth = 1
}
setup()
} else {
go()
}
}
def populateAgents() { //Part of initialization, create all Civs with uniform
opinion and Cops
setDefaultShape(Civilian, "person")
setDefaultShape(Cop, "star")
createCivilians(numCivilians) {
riskAversion = randomFloat(1)
opinionGene = new ArrayList([0] * 20)
int zeroPoints = random(21) // number of chromosomes to leave 0
def posElements = new LinkedList(0..19)
while (zeroPoints > 0) {
posElements -= oneOf(posElements)
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231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252

zeroPoints -}
for (i in posElements) {
opinionGene[i] = 1
}
grievance = opinionGene.sum() / 20 * (1 - legitimacy)
}
createCops(numCops) {
setColor(yellow())
}
}
def setUpLists() { //Part of initialization, setting up all lists
inactives = new LinkedList(civilians().toList()) //none are active yet
actives = new LinkedList() //none are active yet
prisoners = new LinkedList() //none are jailed yet
def numLiterates = round(literacy * numCivilians) //set literate group
literates = new ArrayList()
def tempLiterates = nOf(numLiterates, civilians()) //for use here and with
web users
literates = tempLiterates.toList()

253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281

def numWebUsers = round(connectivity * numCivilians)
webUsers = new ArrayList()
webUsers = nOf(numWebUsers, tempLiterates).toList() //assume illiterate
cannot use web
}
def initializeAgents() { //Place all Civs, Cops, MISOs; check for rebels and
set colors
ask(turtles()) {
targetPatch = oneOf(emptyPatches)
emptyPatches -= targetPatch
moveTo(targetPatch)
assert targetPatch == patchHere()
}
ask(civilians()) {
checkActive()
checkColor()
jailed = false
}
ask(patches()) {
checkColor()
}
}
def implementMISO() { //Adding various MISO agents, global values set in Panel
//add a rebel pamphlet distributor
createMISOs(numRebPamphlets) { // change this number to alter number of
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282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
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308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331

such agents
//changeable values
commBreadth = rebBreadth
commRange = 3
commAttempts = 10
susceptibles = literates
rebel = true // set to false for government, true for rebel
setShape("frowny")
setColor(white())
}
//add a government pamphleter
createMISOs(numGovPamphlets) { // change this number to alter number of
such agents
//changeable values
commBreadth = govBreadth
commRange = 3
commAttempts = 10
susceptibles = literates
rebel = false // set to false for government, true for rebel
setShape("smiley")
setColor(white())
}
//add a rebel internet campaign
createMISOs(numRebWebCampaigns) { // change this number to alter
number of such agents
//changeable values
commBreadth = rebBreadth
commRange = 40
commAttempts = 10
susceptibles = webUsers
rebel = true // set to false for government, true for rebel
setShape("house")
setColor(orange())
}
//add a government internet campaign
createMISOs(numGovWebCampaigns) { // change this number to alter number
of such agents
//changeable values
commBreadth = govBreadth
commRange = 40
commAttempts = 10
susceptibles = webUsers
rebel = false // set to false for government, true for rebel
setShape("house")
setColor(white())
}
//initialization of MISO Agents
ask(MISOs()) {
def tempBreadth = commBreadth
commTopics = new LinkedList(1..20)
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332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346 }

while (tempBreadth < 20) {
commTopics -= oneOf(commTopics)
tempBreadth ++
}
}
}
def checkAssertions() { //Verification
assert count(actives) == count(civilians().with({active & !jailed}))
assert count(prisoners) == count(civilians().with({jailed}))
assert totalSize == count(emptyPatches) + count(actives) + count(inactives) +
numCops + count(MISOs())
}
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Appendix C. Code for Civilian.groovy
1 package civilviolence.relogo
2
3 import org.opengis.util.UnlimitedInteger;
4
5 import static repast.simphony.relogo.Utility.*;
6 import static repast.simphony.relogo.UtilityG.*;
7 import repast.simphony.relogo.BasePatch;
8 import repast.simphony.relogo.BaseTurtle;
9 import repast.simphony.relogo.Plural;
10 import repast.simphony.relogo.Stop;
11 import repast.simphony.relogo.Utility;
12 import repast.simphony.relogo.UtilityG;
13
14 class Civilian extends BaseTurtle {
15
16
// Attributes used in checkActive
17
def opinionGene //Array of size 20, used in manner of genetic algorithm
18
def grievance //Mean value of opinionGene elements multiplied by (1 - legitimacy)
19
def riskAversion //Drawn from Uniform(0,1)
20
def C //Cops in vision
21
def A //Active rebels in vision
22
def probArrest //Subjective estimate of arrest probability - P in write-up
23
def activePrior //True if active rebel last tick
24
def active //True if active rebel
25
def jailed //True if rebel jailed
26
def netRisk //probArrest x risk aversion (N = RP in write-up)
27
28
// Attributes used to track jail timing
29
def jailTerm //assigned by Cop at arrest
30
def timeInJail //incremented every turn while jailed, then reset at release
31
32
// Attributes used in discrete space movement
33
def sourcePatch //where Civ starts tick
34
def availablePatches //patches within range that are empty
35
def targetPatch //where Civ moves
36
37
def step() { //called once every tick
38
if(jailed) {
39
timeInJail++
40
if(timeInJail >= jailTerm & !unlimitedJailTerm) {
41
releaseFromJail()
42
}
43
} else {
44
move()
45
checkActive()
46
checkComm()
47
}
48
assert grievance >= 0 //Verification
49
assert grievance <= 1 //Verification
50
}
51
52
def move() {
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54
55
56
57
58
59
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62
63
64
65
66
67

68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

assert jailed == false //Will throw error if jailed, jailed Civs cannot move
sourcePatch = patchHere()
availablePatches = inRadius(emptyPatches,civRange)
if(!emptyQ(availablePatches)) {
//First try to move near a friend
def localCivs = inRadius(inactives,civVision) +
inRadius(actives,civVision)
def localFriends
def me = self()
if(count(localCivs) > 0 & !disableMoveTowardFriends) {
localFriends = localCivs.with {
if(!relationshipNeighborQ(me)) {
false //no relationship, so can't be friends
} else {
relationshipWith(me).friend //checks if
relationship type is friend, to enable
other types
}
}
if(count(localFriends) > 0) {
def friendToMoveTo = oneOf(localFriends) // pick a
friend to move toward
targetPatch = minOneOf(availablePatches) { // pick the
patch closest to the friend
distance(friendToMoveTo)
}
} else {
// no nearby friends, move to random patch
targetPatch = oneOf(availablePatches)
}
} else {
// there are no local civilians, or friend movement is turned off
targetPatch = oneOf(availablePatches)
}
emptyPatches -= targetPatch
moveTo(targetPatch)
assert targetPatch == patchHere() //Verification
emptyPatches += sourcePatch
}
}
def checkActive() {
C = count(inRadius(cops(),civVision))
A = count(inRadius(actives,civVision))
if(!active) {A++} // Compare as if Civ had already gone active
probArrest = 1 - (e()**(-k*(C/A)))
netRisk = riskAversion * probArrest // * maxJailTerm**alpha if jail terms deter
rebellion - see Epstein (2006)
checkColor() // Update Civ color
}
def checkColor() {
if(grievance - netRisk > rebelThreshold) {
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102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
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126
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130
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139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153

active = true
setColor(red())
if(!activePrior) {
actives += self()
inactives -= self()
activePrior = true
}
} else {
active = false
setColor(blue())
if(activePrior) {
actives -= self()
inactives += self()
activePrior = false
}
}
}
def checkComm() {
def localCivs = civiliansOn(neighbors()).with({!jailed})
if(count(localCivs) > 0) { //if no neighbors, no communication
communicate(oneOf(localCivs))
}
}
def communicate(target) {
def dGrievance = 0
for (i in 0..19) {
if (target.opinionGene[i] != opinionGene[i]) {
dGrievance ++
}
}
dGrievance = dGrievance / 20 * (1 - legitimacy)
checkLinks(target, dGrievance)
if(!disableComm) {
def targetMeme = random(20)
target.opinionGene[targetMeme] = opinionGene[targetMeme]
target.grievance = target.opinionGene.sum() / 20 * (1 - legitimacy)
//introduce 1% probability of random mutation
if(randomFloat(1) < 0.01) {
def locus = random(19)
opinionGene[locus] = 1 - opinionGene[locus]
}
}
}
def checkLinks(target, dGrievance) { //if in friendship threshold, create or maintain
friendship
if(abs(dGrievance) <= friendThreshold) {
if(!relationshipNeighborQ(target)) {
createRelationshipWith(target) {
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170
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175 }

friend = true
age = 0
}
} else {
def commLink = relationshipWith(target)
commLink.age = 0
}
}
}
def releaseFromJail() {
// Jail term is up, so release them!
targetPatch = oneOf(emptyPatches)
moveTo(targetPatch)
emptyPatches -= targetPatch
showTurtle()
jailed = false
prisoners -= self()
actives += self()
checkActive()
}
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Appendix D. Code for Cop.groovy
1 package civilviolence.relogo
2
3 import static repast.simphony.relogo.Utility.*;
4 import static repast.simphony.relogo.UtilityG.*;
5 import repast.simphony.relogo.BasePatch;
6 import repast.simphony.relogo.BaseTurtle;
7 import repast.simphony.relogo.Plural;
8 import repast.simphony.relogo.Stop;
9 import repast.simphony.relogo.Utility;
10 import repast.simphony.relogo.UtilityG;
11
12 class Cop extends BaseTurtle {
13
14
// Attributes used in discrete space movement
15
def sourcePatch
16
def availablePatches
17
def targetPatch
18
def arrestedToday
19
def arrestedPatch
20
21
// Attributes used in checkArrest
22
def nearbyRebels
23
24
def step() {
25
checkArrest() //look for someone to arrest
26
move() //move to arrest location or randomly in range
27
}
28
29
def move() {
30
31
sourcePatch = patchHere()
32
33
if(arrestedToday) { // Cop moved to the arrest location
34
targetPatch = arrestedPatch
35
emptyPatches -= targetPatch
36
moveTo(targetPatch)
37
assert targetPatch == patchHere()
38
emptyPatches += sourcePatch
39
} else { // No arrest, so move randomly
40
availablePatches = inRadius(emptyPatches,copVision)
41
if(!emptyQ(availablePatches)) {
42
targetPatch = oneOf(availablePatches)
43
emptyPatches -= targetPatch
44
moveTo(targetPatch)
45
assert targetPatch == patchHere()
46
emptyPatches += sourcePatch
47
}
48
}
49
arrestedToday = false // Reset value for next turn
50
}
51
52
def checkArrest() {
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70
71 }

nearbyRebels = inRadius(actives,copVision)
if(!emptyQ(nearbyRebels)) {
// Cop sees a rebel. Book him Dano!
def arrestee = oneOf(nearbyRebels)
arrestedToday = true
arrestedPatch = arrestee.patchHere()
// Cop is going to move to the location of the poor sap.
ask(arrestee) {
jailed = true
jailTerm = random(maxJailTerm)
timeInJail = 0
emptyPatches += patchHere()
actives -= self()
prisoners += self()
hideTurtle()
}
}
}
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Appendix E. Code for MISO.groovy
1 package civilviolence.relogo
2
3 import static repast.simphony.relogo.Utility.*;
4 import static repast.simphony.relogo.UtilityG.*;
5 import repast.simphony.relogo.BasePatch;
6 import repast.simphony.relogo.BaseTurtle;
7 import repast.simphony.relogo.Plural;
8 import repast.simphony.relogo.Stop;
9 import repast.simphony.relogo.Utility;
10 import repast.simphony.relogo.UtilityG;
11
12 class MISO extends BaseTurtle {
13
14
//local variables
15
def commBreadth // How many of the 20 opinions does the agent focus on?
16
def commRange // How far away is communication effective?
17
def commAttempts // With how many civilians can agent interact in one turn?
18
def commTopics // Specific opinions this agent focuses upon
19
def susceptibles // Set to either literates or webUsers, depending on type
20
def rebel // Set to true if rebel, false if pro-government
21
def targetPatch // Needed for initial location
22
23
def step() {
24
def targetList = defineTargets()
25
//println(self().toString() + targetList) //Provides output to console for verification
26
communicate(targetList)
27
}
28
29
def defineTargets() {
30
def targetList = new LinkedList()
31
targetList += inRadius(susceptibles, commRange).with{!jailed}
32
def removals = count(targetList) - commAttempts
33
while (removals > 0) {
34
targetList -= oneOf(targetList)
35
removals -36
}
37
targetList
38
}
39
40
def communicate(targets) {
41
def comm = { //set closure for use in a foreach() command (below)
42
//Note: commented-out println() commands were used for verification and
may be useful. They output to console.
43
def topic = oneOf(commTopics)
44
if(rebel) {
45
if(randomFloat(1) < (1 - legitimacy)) {
46
if(it.opinionGene[topic] == 1) {
47
//println("Rebel " + self().toString() + " told " +
it.toString() + " about topic " +
topic.toString() + " and preached to the
choir.")
48
} else {
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49
50

it.opinionGene[topic] = 1
//println("Rebel " + self().toString() + " told " +
it.toString() + " about topic " +
topic.toString() + " and was successful.")

51
52
53
54
55
56

}
}
} else {
if(randomFloat(1) < legitimacy) {
if(it.opinionGene[topic] == 0 ){
//println("Govvy " + self().toString() + " told " +
it.toString() + " about topic " +
topic.toString() + " and preached to the
choir.")
} else {
it.opinionGene[topic] = 0
//println("Govvy " + self().toString() + " told " +
it.toString() + " about topic " +
topic.toString() + " and was successful.")
}
}

57
58
59

60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68 }

}
it.grievance = it.opinionGene.sum() / 20 * (1 - legitimacy) //update target
grievance
}
foreach(comm, targets) //communicate with each target
}
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Appendix F. Code for Relationship.groovy
1 package civilviolence.relogo
2
3 import static repast.simphony.relogo.Utility.*;
4 import static repast.simphony.relogo.UtilityG.*;
5 import repast.simphony.relogo.BaseLink;
6 import repast.simphony.relogo.Directed;
7 import repast.simphony.relogo.Plural;
8 import repast.simphony.relogo.Stop;
9 import repast.simphony.relogo.Undirected;
10 import repast.simphony.relogo.Utility;
11 import repast.simphony.relogo.UtilityG;
12
13 @Undirected
14 class Relationship extends BaseLink {
15
def friend
16
def age
17
18
def step() {
19
age++
20
if (age >= friendLife) {
21
die()
22
}
23
checkColor()
24
}
25
26
def checkColor() {
27
if(friend) {
28
setColor(blue())
29
}
30
}
31 }
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Appendix G. Summary Chart
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